A recent paper in this Journal by Kaplan and Zingales reexamines a subset of rms from work of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen and criticizes the usefulness of investment-cash ow sensitivities for detecting nancing constraints. We show that the Kaplan and Zingales theoretical model fails to capture the approach employed in the literature and thus does not provide an effective critique. Moreover, we describe why their empirical classi cation system is awed in identifying both whether rms are constrained and the relative degree of constraints across rm groups. We conclude that their results do not support their conclusions about the usefulness of investment-cash ow sensitivities.
In a recent paper in this Journal Kaplan and Zingales {1997, hereinafter KZ} argue that investment-cash ow sensitivities do not provide useful evidence about the presence of nancing constraints. Because KZ use a subset of the same rms and the same regressions as Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen {1988, hereinafter FHP} and claim {page 176} that FHP ''can legitimately be considered the parent of all papers in this literature,'' it is appropriate that we respond. Based on a simple theoretical model, KZ reach the provocative conclusion {page 211} that ''the investment-cash ow sensitivity criterion as a measure of nancial constraints is not well-grounded in theory.'' In Section I we show that the KZ model does not capture the theoretical approach employed in FHP and many subsequent studies. Most of the KZ paper attempts to show that empirical investment-cash ow sensitivities do not increase monotonically with the degree of nancing constraints within the 49 low-dividend rms from the FHP sample. In Section II we explain why the KZ classi cation of the degree of constraints is awed in identifying both whether or not rms are constrained (absolute constraints) as well as the relative degree of constraints across rms. As a result, we argue in Section III that there is no expected ex ante pattern for the investment-cash ow sensitivities across the KZ categories, making their empirical results uninformative about the usefulness of investment-cash ow sensitivities.
I. THE KZ MODEL AND TESTS OF FINANCING CONSTRAINTS
The one-period KZ model consists of a return on investment F(I ), internal nancing (W ) with constant opportunity cost, external nancing (E), and a premium for external funds C (E,k) , where k measures the cost wedge between internal and external funds. KZ show that the investment-cash ow sensitivity is
where C 11 is the slope of the supply curve for external nance and Before we assess this conclusion, it is helpful to consider the intuition (which does not appear in KZ) behind why d 2 I/dW 2 may be positive. In Figure I investment is on the horizontal axis, F 1 is investment demand, W L or W H indicates the quantity of internal nancing (with constant marginal cost as indicated by the horizontal line segment), and C 1 is the supply of external funds. In the left panel of Figure I , F 111 5 0 and C 111 , 0 (i.e., linear demand and concave supply). Investment is more sensitive to small internal nance uctuations (D W ) at high internal nance (W H ) than at low internal nance (W L ) because a rm at W H uses less external nancing, and therefore the concavity of supply causes its C 11 to be larger (see equation (1)). Alternatively, consider F 111 . 0 and C 111 5 0 (i.e., convex demand and linear supply) as in the right panel of Figure I . Again, investment is more sensitive to W at W H than at W L because investment demand is more sensitive to the cost of capital as W rises.
This focus in KZ on d 2 I/dW 2 does not provide an effective critique of the literature (including the FHP theoretical approach) because most studies do not use the level of W to classify rms. 2 Instead, FHP and much of the literature classify rms according to a priori criteria designed to give large differences in the slope of the external nancing schedule, C 11 , across groups. The obvious testable implication of this approach, using equation (1), is that constrained rms with a large C 11 should have a larger dI/dW than (relatively) unconstrained rms with a small (or zero) C 11 , other things equal. 3 The necessary condition for dI/dW to be larger for constrained rms is
2. In fact, KZ never reference any speci c study, including FHP, to demonstrate the relevance of d 2 I/dW 2 .
3. To appreciate the intuition graphically, consider the effect of a small change in W on two rms with linear demand curves. If the ''constrained'' rm faces relatively steep and the ''unconstrained'' rm relatively at supply, the result is obvious. KZ implicitly assume away this possibility by positing that all rms face the same C11 for a given level of E.
FIGURE I Illustrations of the KZ Model
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While F 11 may differ across rms, we can think of no reasons why F 11
Constrained should be systematically greater than F 11
Unconstrained
, and KZ provide no reasons. Thus, as long as researchers separate rms by a priori criteria that result in C 11 Constrained . C 11 Unconstrained in the relevant range, the comparison of dI/dW across rm groups has a solid theoretical foundation. We also point out that as C 11
Unconstrained approaches zero, as we argue below is the case in many studies, (3) almost certainly holds. In addition, if (3) holds, the issues that KZ raise about curvature and nonlinearity are not likely to be relevant. 4 The only remaining question is whether previous research has effectively classi ed rms in ways that generate large differences in C 11 . Consider the model and discussion in FHP {pages 146-157 and Appendix A}. In the supply of funds schedule in FHP Figure I , C 11 equals zero for internal nancing (as in KZ) and C 11 is greater than zero for external nancing. One group of rms faces C 11 of zero at the margin because investment demand is less than internal nancing. In contrast, constrained rms exhaust internal funds and nance marginal investment with external funds, and thus face a positive C 11 . Operationally, as implied by the model, unconstrained rms are those with large dividend payouts, and constrained rms are those with low or zero dividends.
Since FHP, many other researchers have devised different approaches for separating rms into groups with low and high C 11 . 5 A common separating criterion is access to public debt. Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel {1995} report that rms with debt ratings are very different from rms without rated debt. Firms that issue public debt, especially commercial paper, are far larger on average, have much lower volatility of sales and income, and therefore pose relatively little, possibly negligible, default risk. The case can be made that rms with commercial paper or high bond ratings face a C 11 close to zero. Almost surely, rms that issue public debt tend to have a substantially lower C 11 than those 4. KZ also mention the possibility of ''nonmonotonicity'' with the wedge k as a proxy for the degree of nancing constraints. This approach is not relevant to the FHP model, discussed in the next paragraph, because high-dividend rms, in theory, face no wedge at the margin. In general, if researchers effectively split their samples with criteria that generate large differences in k that lead to large differences in C11, the condition in equation (3) is likely to be satis ed.
5. See Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel {1995}; Gilchrist and Himmelberg {1995, 1998}; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein {1994}; and Whited {1992}. Hubbard {1998} provides many other references. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein {1991} use association with a large bank to identify rms with a relatively low C11. In addition, many studies split samples by rm size which is highly correlated with both dividend payout and access to public debt.
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that do not. In contrast, many rms without public debt also have little bank debt, consistent with the fact that many of them are small, high-technology companies with little collateral and likely pronounced moral hazard and adverse selection problems (see, for example, Himmelberg and Petersen {1994}). Thus, a strong case can be made that these rms face a high C 11 for external nancing.
Empirical evidence from most studies is consistent with equation (1) in the sense that rms likely to have a priori high C 11 , (e.g., rms with low dividends, no public debt, or small size) almost always have a larger dI/dW than rms likely to have a low C 11 . Furthermore, many studies cannot reject dI/dW equals zero for control groups selected to have a low (or zero) C 11 (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg {1995, 1998}) . 6 Thus, the implications of the theoretical approach in much previous research are supported by the evidence.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE KZ EMPIRICAL CLASSIFICATION APPROACH
KZ employ managerial statements and quantitative measures from rms' nancial statements to sort the 49 FHP lowdividend rms into one of ve groups:
7 Not Financially Constrained (NFC), Likely Not Financially Constrained (LNFC), Possibly Financially Constrained (PFC), Likely Financially Constrained (LFC), and Financially Constrained (FC). This section summarizes our concerns about the effectiveness of their approach for determining both absolute and relative constraints across rms.
A. Reliance on Managers' Statements and Regulation S-K
To justify use of managerial statements to identify the degree of nancing constraints, KZ {p. 180} rely on Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation S-K which they claim ''explicitly requires rms to disclose whether or not they are having difficulty nancing their investments.'' It is not obvious, however, that this regulation forces a rm to reveal nancing constraints. We contacted Robert Lipe, Academic Fellow in the Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC and asked whether a rm that is 6. See also Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein {1994}. Some Euler equations studies cannot reject C11 equal to zero for control groups of rms {Gilchrist 1991; Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited 1995; Whited 1992}. 7. KZ do not explain how these diverse criteria are speci cally combined to classify rms into the ve groups.
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unable to undertake a new, positive NPV project due to nancing constraints would be obliged to reveal this information. Lipe responded that this is not the case. Rather, he explained, Regulation S-K requires the rm to reveal the inability to invest due to nancing constraints only when the rm fails to act on a previously announced investment commitment. As a result, we doubt the relevance of self-serving managers' statements as evidence of the absence of nancing constraints in most situations.
B. Problems with the Quantitative Classi cation Criteria
The classi cation criteria in KZ include cash stocks, unused lines of credit, and leverage. They report summary measures for these variables in Table III {KZ, pages 185-187} and argue that they support the success of their relative ranking of the degree of nancing constraints and their nding that the rms face absolute nancing constraints (PFC, LFC, or FC) in only 15 percent of the rm-years.
We begin by explaining why the summary statistics in KZ do not support their surprising nding about the infrequency of absolute constraints in the FHP sample. KZ suggest that both the cash ow and the cash stock positions for NFC and LNFC rm-years are so large relative to xed investment that these rms could not be nancially constrained. Their numbers in Table  III , however, are misleading because they implicitly assume that rms use sources of nancing only for xed investment when, in fact, growing companies invest heavily in both inventories and accounts receivable (see Fazzari and Petersen {1993, pages 330-331}).
We recomputed the KZ gures with the proper comparison of cash ow and cash stocks relative to total investment ( xed investment plus the changes in inventories and accounts receivable). These new statistics change some of the KZ conclusions. For example, KZ {page 184} note that the median value of cash ow less xed investment is positive for NFC rm-years and write ''{t}his suggests that NFC rms could have increased their investment without tapping external sources of capital.'' In sharp contrast, in our computations the median value of cash ow less total investment is negative at the seventy-fth percentile for even the NFC and LNFC rms. Thus, most NFC and LNFC rms exhaust all internal nance for investment purposes. Furthermore, while the median cash stock-xed investment ratio for NFC and LNFC rm-years is 0.66 (similar to the statistics in KZ Table
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III) the median ratio of cash stocks to total investment is only 0.27. 8 In our opinion, this cash stock ratio is too small to support the interpretation in KZ of the absence of nancing constraints. Financially constrained rms will rationally maintain some buffer stock of cash to protect against having to cancel or delay investment projects as well as to avoid the costs associated with nancial distress. It is well-known that cash ow is volatile in manufacturing, frequently declining by 50 percent or more and often becoming negative during a recession. Suppose, for example, that cash ow declined to zero. Our computations indicate that NFC and LNFC rms could maintain only about three months of median total investment from cash stocks, and then only if these stocks were (implausibly) driven to zero. We believe these statistics are consistent with the view that these rms face absolute nancing constraints. The cash stock, unused lines of credit, and leverage gures are also unreliable measures of the relative degree of nancing constraints. Firms may have low debt because they cannot convince lenders to provide them with credit, perhaps due to lack of collateral, and low-debt rms may therefore face more severe constraints. For example, small high-tech companies-much of the FHP sample-tend to have little collateral value, and little debt, possibly because their assets are intangible or rm-speci c (see, for example, Himmelberg and Petersen {1994}). In addition, comparatively large cash positions or unused lines of credit may indicate relatively severe constraints. As argued in recent papers {Fazzari and Petersen 1993; Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen 1994; Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel 1995} , it is costly for constrained rms to adjust xed investment when internal funds uctuate. Forward-looking rms will therefore partially protect themselves with buffer stocks of cash or unused debt capacity. The more nancially constrained a rm is, the greater is its incentive to accumulate liquid buffer stocks. Such a rm may be able to invest more at the margin at a moment in time, but the rm is nonetheless nancially constrained. This dynamic perspective contrasts with the static view of nancing constraints employed by KZ, which creates problems in their classi cation approach.
8. This statistic excludes observations for which total investment is less than or equal to zero. KZ also point out that unused lines of credit are larger for NFC and LNFC rms. We do not have these data, but the ratios of slack to investment reported by KZ on page 188 would be similarly reduced by recognizing a broader measure of investment.
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C. The Absence of Heterogeneity in the KZ Classi cation
One striking nding in KZ is that only 19 of 719 observations (2.6 percent) are FC and another 34 observations (4.8 percent) are LFC. Given so few FC and LFC observations, how do KZ obtain enough FC rms for their regressions? KZ placed rms in the FC category if they had just a single year (out of 15) with an FC or LFC rating. In the FC category, 14 of the 22 rms had an FC or LFC rating only one or two times, while six rms had FC or LFC ratings in just three or four of the fteen years. For this reason, the difference in cash ow coefficients across the KZ regressions may have little to do with their relative ranking of nancing constraints.
III. THE KZ REGRESSION RESULTS
KZ nd that the investment of NFC and LNFC rms displays a greater sensitivity to cash ow than FC rms. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of this pattern of results. One possibility is that the FC rms include some years of nancial distress. KZ describe rms in FC years as having ''liquidity problems,'' which is not surprising given that their criteria for receiving the FC classi cation include violation of debt covenants and renegotiation of debt payments {page 182}. The KZ summary statistics in Table III also strongly suggest that the FC rm-years are periods of nancial distress. 9 During years of nancial distress, rms, possibly at the insistence of their creditors, are likely to use cash ow to enhance liquidity and avoid bankruptcy resulting in little change in xed investment as measured in Compustat. A broader measure of investment, however, is likely to respond much more to cash ow for such rms.
10
Financial distress is one possible explanation for the low cash ow coefficient of the FC rms. Regardless of how one explains the 9. The mean cash ow-net plant ratio for these observations is 2 0.047 and the mean of interest coverage is only 1.650. While KZ recognize the possibility of nancial distress in FC observations {page 208}, the defense they offer is not convincing. They note that rms increase rather than repay debt in the PFC, LFC, and FC years. This observation, however, may be due to creditors permitting illiquid, but growing, rms to rebuild liquidity.
10. Financially distressed rms (with low or negative cash ow) often disinvest assets with low adjustment costs such as working capital (see Fazzari and Petersen {1993}) . In addition, such rms likely sell off existing xed assets. Neither of these responses are included in the Compustat measure of xed investment and ignoring them causes a downward bias in the cash ow coefficient, especially at times of nancial distress.
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pattern of results in KZ, however, we argue that this pattern is not informative. As discussed in the previous section, the rms in the NFC and LNFC categories likely are nancially constrained and the relative degree of constraints across the KZ categories is far from clear. If there is no clear a priori difference in nancing constraints across the rm groups in KZ, their strategy does not meet the criterion (summarized by equation (3)) necessary for meaningful tests of nancing constraints with rm heterogeneity.
Finally, KZ {page 196} present additional tests with groupings based on ''quantitative/objective data.'' The only one of these tests consistent with their main ndings shows that rms with high interest coverage have higher cash ow coefficients than rms with low coverage. KZ imply that the pattern should be the opposite, but this need not be the case. As we discussed earlier, either low levels of debt or high interest coverage may indicate an inability to obtain debt nancing, possibly signaling relatively severe nancial constraints. KZ {page 211} themselves note that some studies use high leverage as an indicator of more severe nancing constraints, while other studies argue the opposite. Thus, these tests do little to bolster the KZ conclusions. 11 IV. CONCLUSION KZ argue that investment-cash ow sensitivities do not provide useful evidence about the presence of nancing constraints. We believe that this conclusion does not follow from their analysis for two reasons. First, their theoretical model fails to capture the approach of most previous research, making their theoretical analysis irrelevant as a criticism of FHP and most subsequent research. Second, the KZ empirical ndings are difficult to interpret. The 49 low-dividend FHP rms are a poor choice for such a study because they are relatively homogeneous for purposes of testing for capital-market imperfections, making it extremely difficult to classify these rms nely by degree of nancing constraints. Furthermore, some of the KZ classi cation 11. Two new studies are relevant to the KZ results. In a sample of large, dividend-paying rms, Cleary {1999} argues that the ''most nancially constrained'' rms have the lowest investment-cash ow sensitivity. These FC rms, however, appear to be nancially distressed. Their mean net income is 2 4.8 percent of sales compared with 9.6 percent for NFC rms. Mean sales growth for FC rms is 2 2.3 percent versus 23.5 percent for the NFC rms. Winter {1998}, using the KZ sample, includes the KZ indicator of nancial constraint status in regressions for investment and rm exit. He nds that the KZ indicator is either statistically insigni cant or, when signi cant, has the wrong sign.
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criteria (e.g., stock of cash and degree of leverage), may indicate high or low levels of constraints. We therefore believe their nding of nonmonotonic investment-cash ow sensitivities is not informative.
While the sweeping critical conclusions in KZ do not follow from their results, we believe their paper makes a contribution. Empirical work in this area has not always clearly identi ed the theoretical model under investigation. While FHP provided a model of investment behavior that described the criteria for separating rms into ''constrained'' and ''unconstrained'' categories, not all papers have done so. In addition, while commonly used separating criteria have a solid theoretical foundation, not all criteria are as defensible. KZ (and we hope this comment) will lead future researchers to clearly state their model and to carefully choose the criteria used for de ning constrained and unconstrained groupings.
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